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ABSTRACT
Th e latest Hungarian economic growth data, though favourable, do not let us 
forget that in the longer term growth is weak compared to the preceding period 
– as well as to the performance of the East-Central European region, which is 
more dynamic than the European average. In order to make sense of the past dec-
ade’s relative loss of pace and lay the foundations for future development policy, 
it is worth placing Hungary’s case in the context of the slowing tempo typical of 
middle-income countries. Th e economic development policies currently pursued 
by the government are aimed at increasing output in the processing industry, and 
by extension exports, while relevant international experience advises that it is 
the higher value-added activities of the global value chain, particularly business 
services, which should be developed further. In this way real wages and income 
levels could be increased, and the economy would be less exposed to the fl uctua-
tions of international cycles.
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INTRODUCTION
In the case of an open economy, we can speak of economic growth and develop-
ment – particularly on a time horizon extending beyond the prevailing business 
cycle – only within an international comparative framework. Th is is obvious-
ly true of the Hungarian economy, which is known for its very high degree of 
openness to the outside. Th e application of a longer time horizon and measuring 
against external standards helps us navigate the issue of how to qualify the per-
formance of an economy at a given time, an apparently straightforward question 
that is nevertheless oft en subject to diametrically opposed interpretations. Let us 
take the question of economic conditions in Hungary. Hungarian economic data 
from the 2014–15 period to date, according to one authoritative economic analy-
sis, qualify as very favourable by European comparison (EC, 2015). At the same 
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time, in the light of longer-term comparative data, Hungary can be placed among 
the countries with slower growth in the East-Central European (ECE) region; we 
will discuss the dimensions and issues of classifi cation later. 
Th e ECE region itself has been showing growth achievements surpassing the aver-
age among European Union member countries for some considerable time. At the 
same time, average growth in the EU is fairly modest by global comparison, so 
that even with a growth index exceeding the EU average the ECE region still does 
not belong among the most particularly dynamic groups of countries in the world 
economy. Against this backdrop, it is easy to understand, despite the Hungarian 
government’s own confi dent, even enthusiastic assessments citing the latest data 
(albeit oft en growth indices of only a few quarters), why an anxious debate over 
Hungary’s economic performance has been ongoing for some time among do-
mestic economists. Th at the Hungarian economy has been losing ground on other 
countries in the immediate region – and particularly the faster-growing “emerg-
ing” countries – is thoroughly documented; academics treat this relative stagna-
tion as an accepted fact (Muraközy, 2013; Oblath, 2013; Palócz, 2013; Oblath, 2014). 
When there is a prolonged and perceptible deterioration in the dynamics of a 
nation’s economy, the realm of politics tends to respond with initiatives aimed 
at remedying the situation, and Hungary is no exception. Th e events of the years 
preceding the 2008 fi nancial crisis were rich in announcements of various ini-
tiatives, but poor in implementation and hence in results. Subsequently, amid 
changed external and domestic circumstances from 2010 onwards, we witnessed 
a high degree of government activity in this regard. Th is compares to 2008–2009, 
when the scope for action in economic policy was essentially limited to crisis 
management. 
Th ese consecutive phases in economic policy, following each other in quick suc-
cession, are naturally subject to the thorough critical analysis of academia. Th e 
above-mentioned and other authoritative experts, among factors leading to the 
loss of pace compared to the growth average in the ECE region as a whole in the 
immediately preceding decade, assign special signifi cance to the frequent errors 
made in economic policy. Th ese diff ered from period to period. Analyses deal-
ing with the theme repeatedly cite excessive indebtedness and the simultaneous 
postponement of necessary reform measures at the start of the 2000s, while in the 
period since 2010 they blame a lack of consistency in government decisions and 
consequent deterioration in the predictability of doing business. 
Moreover, the lag in growth of the Hungarian economy apparent in regional 
comparison is not the single troublesome factor. It is accompanied by – and has 
a certain causal relationship with – the deterioration of Hungary’s position on 
international comparative lists measuring competitiveness, corruption and other 
economically relevant aspects (Transparency International, 2014; Győrff y, 2014).
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Th e year 2010 represents a kind of boundary line in the economic assessment of 
growth problems, as it spelled the passing of the short but deep recession that 
reached our country in the autumn of 2008 as a consequence of the fi nancial 
crisis. It was also when a new government ascended to power enjoying huge scope 
for political manoeuvre and proclaiming a set of proactive governing policies. 
Rejecting the practice of stabilisation followed by its predecessors, it looked to 
robust economic growth to alleviate the social and economic problems arising 
from indebtedness and a general loss of dynamism. 
Th e principal measures aimed at enhancing economic dynamism included the 
transformation of the system of welfare provision to increase employment; the in-
troduction of a single low rate of personal income tax, and major reductions in the 
levels of direct taxes in general; the transformation of the structure of EU funds 
and accelerated drawdown of these funds; and priority state support for indus-
trial activity and, in a broader sense, the proclamation of “reindustrialisation.” 
Th e government was also partly asserting the principles of increased economic 
dynamism when it included in its platform a shift  in the direction of Hungary’s 
foreign trade and fi nancial partnerships towards regions of dynamic growth (the 
“eastward opening”).
At the same time, the stabilisation of the balance of public fi nances using unique 
and non-standard tools has had a detrimental eff ect on the growth process, since 
economic players have viewed the government’s frequent improvisations and 
regulatory hyperactivity as injurious to legal security and predictability. As the 
combined consequence of a stream of economic policy initiatives, business and 
investor uncertainty has increased, as extensive corporate surveys have amply 
demonstrated (see, for example, DUIH, 2014).
Hungary’s slowing pace: a unique case or part of a pattern?
Th e declining tempo of economic growth is not unique to Hungary. Th e interna-
tional fi nancial disturbances of 2008–2009 had a powerful impact on the growth 
performance of the entire global economy, and not only to a temporary extent. 
Beyond the cyclical eff ects, there were also structural consequences; aft er 2009, 
for example, in what was by then a renewed phase of growth, the ratio of exports 
to GDP declined (Constantinescu–Mattoo–Ruta, 2015). In itself this has a restrain-
ing infl uence on the growth indices of countries which are especially open eco-
nomically, with growth paths defi ned by continuously increasing exports. Hun-
gary’s economy falls into this category; besides individual factors, this structural 
aspect may also play a part in the evolution of its growth performance since 2008. 
An examination of Hungarian macroeconomic indicators shows that the increas-
ing volatility of economic variables linked to external openness is itself a factor 
A TEMPORARY LOSS OF PACE OR THE “MIDDLE INCOME TRAP” 5
explaining the decline in tempo (see in particular Oblath, 2014a). In favourable 
periods, outwardly very open economies grow more rapidly than similarly devel-
oped but less open ones. However, when external conditions take a turn for the 
worse, they suff er deeper recessions, while sudden direction shift s in economic 
processes themselves weaken their ability to sustain growth (even without further 
changes such as political cycles).  
Th e European economy as a whole, which infl uences Hungarian growth in many 
ways (and of course that of the other countries in the region), suff ered a seri-
ous decline in the wake of the 2008 fi nancial crisis, showing a weak and fragile 
growth performance in the years following the crisis. With respect to the weak-
ness of the European economic trend, some opinions hold that the major decline 
of recent years and the relatively weak dynamics of the recovery phase are not 
attributable to cyclical factors, but rather that we must prepare for a lasting pe-
riod of stagnation not only in Europe, but also in the other rich, developed (core) 
countries of the global economy (Teulings–Baldwin, 2014). Accordingly, this is 
not an issue aff ecting only a group of countries or a continent; the danger of pro-
longed stagnation may be lurking for all those countries that have achieved a high 
level of development and income. In this way, the question of the actual income 
level enters the discussion of growth capacity and tempo as an explanatory factor; 
the above-mentioned volume of studies on the secular stagnation awaiting devel-
oped countries places precisely this aspect at the focus of its analysis. 
All this has seemingly led us far astray from an explanation for the measurable 
decline in the long-term pace of growth of the Hungarian economy, since our 
country cannot be regarded as rich: on international lists it generally falls into the 
middle-income group, or upper-middle income group if the categories are broken 
down further. Th e phenomenon of relative stagnation, does not, aft er all, appear 
to be aff ected by the income level issue, since numerous countries in our region 
in a similar situation and with a similar level of development have shown a better 
growth performance than Hungary for a longer time on average. And yet it may 
still be signifi cant that Hungary is a moderately developed country according 
to macroeconomic indicators describing the income and wealth situation, since 
many international comparative analyses show the usual pace of growth routine-
ly slowing once an economy rises above a certain level of development (see, for 
example, Eichengreen–Park–Shin, 2011). Th e authors found that when GDP per 
capita reaches the USD 15,000 level, the pace of economic growth abruptly di-
minishes. However, they merely demonstrated the statistical connection, without 
discussing the factors explaining the phenomenon or whether an antidote exists 
– and if so, what it might be. 
A wealth of statistical data and observations support the idea that what we are 
dealing with is a straightforward growth trap with respect to the moderately de-
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veloped countries (Gill–Kharas, 2007). Researchers on this topic perceive this trap 
lying in the fact that growth in most of the aff ected economies is slowing or even 
stopping, meaning that the bulk of these countries are unable to join the group 
of developed, high-income countries within the foreseeable future, and are stuck 
instead on the level they have reached. 
Th e basis for forming a group can be any predetermined threshold value – al-
though a comparison to some relative position (determined on the level of other 
economies) provides a more realistic assessment of the condition of a given na-
tion’s economy. At global organisations such as the World Bank or the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, the benchmark for comparison is the United States, with 
its very high level of national income per capita: in this context, we can speak 
of groups of low-income, middle-income and high-income countries.1 Th ese cat-
egories, as well as more refi ned subcategories, are created according to a given 
methodology. In a rapidly changing world, the classifi cations are naturally open 
to debate: the World Bank lists Hungary in the “upper middle income” group 
alongside Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and Bosnia, while the formerly planned 
economies of Latvia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Croatia are placed 
in the group of developed (“high income”) countries – as is Russia, despite an 
economic structure far removed from the diversifi ed nature of most developed 
economies, as well as social indicators (e.g. life expectancy at birth) which would 
place it among the middle-income group. 
Th e World Bank’s offi  cial classifi cation clearly does not provide unequivocal 
guidance in the matter of current levels of social and economic development, and 
particularly not with regard to growth paths. Country classifi cations by other 
institutions, business organisations, credit rating agencies and centres of eco-
nomic analysis may diff er signifi cantly from the listing quoted above. However, 
one thing on which they diff er little is that a very substantial number of these 
economies – including Hungary – are very easily distinguishable from both the 
developing (“third world”) countries and the leading economies which constitute 
the centre of economic and social growth. Th e latter serve as the benchmark for 
the less-developed countries (albeit no longer to be so unambiguously regarded 
as models of growth). 
Th e theoretical problem of growth in the case of Hungary, Poland and other 
countries at a similar level of development is the same: whether it is possible to 
1 Th e principles and methods of sorting into groups can be found in the World Bank’s classifi -
cation document: http://data.worldbank.org/country (downloaded: 12 January 2015). Th e basis for 
Hungary’s classifi cation is its annual gross national income (GNI) fi gure of USD 13,260 per capita in 
2013, which is truly a more appropriate measure than GDP per capita. At the same time, the equiva-
lent Polish fi gure is USD 13,240 – which nevertheless earns the country a place in the high income 
bracket.
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truly get closer to the group of the most developed countries – and if so, how. 
As an ever-growing volume of specialised investigative studies on the subject at-
test, examples of countries moving from the moderately developed group to the 
group of highly developed, high-income economies are rare. On arriving at the 
middle-income level, the rapid economic growth factors of the Lewis Model are 
progressively removed: a cheap labour force and the copying or adoption of for-
eign technologies.2 At such times, the phenomenon of decelerating growth oft en 
appears, leading to the birth of the concept of a middle income trap or middle 
income growth trap. 
According to the calculations of Eichengreen and his co-authors, it is primarily 
economies at a national income level of USD 16,700 per capita which may fall 
into this trap, reckoning at 2005 international prices (Eichengreen et al., 2011). 
Although this analysis focused on the future of the rapidly developing Chinese 
economy, both the measures and the driving factors underlying the phenomenon 
are applicable to the Hungarian economy, just as they are to all the newer EU 
member countries. Views, debates and heuristic opinions regarding the structure 
and level of development of the Hungarian economy should be placed within the 
context of a general dilemma aff ecting the status of the transition. 
Th e phenomenon of a frequently perceptible loss of momentum among middle-
income countries has generated a wealth of business and academic writing. At the 
same time, the terminology itself is highly misleading. Th ere is no such trap that 
cannot be avoided from the start, or from which there is no subsequent escape. 
Th e opportunity remains for middle-income countries to continue catching up 
with the more developed regions and groups of countries (the so-called beta-con-
vergence) – only, for some reason or another, some (a few) are succeeding, while 
others (the majority) are not. As a turn of phrase, the idea of an economy falling 
into a “trap” dramatizes the fact of relative growth failure, but it could also be 
interpreted to mean that what has happened with the given economy (in our case 
Hungary) is nothing that has not already happened to a string of other countries 
at a similar development level: an almost “inevitable” loss of pace. Th e line of 
questioning then focuses much more on how certain economies in fundamentally 
similar positions have proven more dynamic and successful in avoiding (either 
permanently or temporarily) the trap awaiting the middle-income countries, and 
how countries that have fallen into this trap might somehow be able to climb out 
and join the few that have succeeded. 
An econometric analysis by a group of IMF economists thoroughly scrutinized 
a set of the aff ected countries (defi ning middle-income economies as those with 
2 Noble Prize winner Sir William Arthur Lewis identifi ed the process of high growth when supply 
of labour is abundant and capital accumulation is strong. 
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GDP per capita between USD 12,000 and USD 16,000), and found fi ve principal 
explanatory groups of factors (Aiyar et al., 2013). Th e fi rst is the quality of institu-
tions: here, a weak legal order, bloated public fi nances and diff use, rigid regula-
tion all slow growth. Th e second group contains demographic variables. Th e third 
group of factors comprises macroeconomic dimensions: openness to foreign trade, 
the role of investment, infl ux of capital and the scale of national debt. Th e eco-
nomic structure also plays a role; as a factor enhancing growth, the fourth group 
lists the migration of the workforce from agriculture to industry and services, as 
well as the process of urbanization. Finally, the distance from the world’s leading 
economies impacts growth performance, as does participation in regional inte-
gration.
Other researchers, such as economists linked to the Asian Development Bank, 
used somewhat diff erent methods (e.g. using GNI per capita as an indicator to 
measure economic development and income levels) to reach slightly diff erent re-
sults and conclusions (Felipe et al., 2012). Based on 2010 data, 40 low-income, 
52 middle-income (consisting of 38 lower middle-income and 14 upper middle-
income) and 32 high-income countries are listed into groups defi ned by set value 
limits: of the 52 middle-income economies, 35 fi nd themselves in the “middle in-
come trap” situation. Th is latter group does not include Hungary according to 
these calculation methods, which suggest that only the possibility of falling into 
the trap exists in Hungary’s case, while both the Polish and Bulgarian economies 
are seen as having good prospects of joining the high-income group. It should be 
noted that the grouping is based on projections of economic growth performance 
in the preceding period and on the time required to reach the value limits (i.e. to 
successfully converge on the category above). 
What is particularly noteworthy in this research, beyond the always debatable 
prognostic assumptions and issues of methodology, is the analysis of variables 
illustrating development or stagnation: here, structural changes in output and ex-
ports are given great weight. Th e research of Felipe et al., follows the traditions of 
the classics of development theory (Lewis, Rostow, Kuznets, Kaldor) in prescrib-
ing a greater proportion of more complex, higher-value, more knowledge-intensive 
products to help countries successfully ascend to a higher level of productivity 
(and thus higher income). Th is notion of development is a process of generating 
new capabilities and new activities and scaling back others, which – if success-
ful – results in higher real wages and encourages companies to switch to more 
capital-intensive production processes (op. cit., p. 46).
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Convergence within limits
Based on the surveyed literature, it can plainly be seen that it is expedient to view 
the problems of Hungarian growth within a broader context, to attribute its con-
cerns not exclusively to the consequences of errors in economic policy or other 
idiosyncratic factors, but rather to interpret them as a case study of the growth 
trap into which moderately developed economies can fall. Economic performance 
and growth potential as it stands today is anyway only partly explained by the 
economic course and economic policies followed in the preceding period, by the 
prevalence of “path-dependency.” Th e deterioration of economic growth capacity 
is typical of the region as a whole – albeit to varying degrees. At the same time, 
it is also true that in terms of convergence with the developed (West European) 
region the diff erences have increased recently. 
Th e question can of course be asked: Is convergence rational as a goal of econom-
ic policy? Should not economic policy and development focus more on the eco-
nomic structure and the institutions which provide the framework of economic 
life? In the discourse on the economic situation, the majority of both the general 
public and political and economic decision-makers regard the importance of con-
vergence with the top rank as self-evident. And yet it is far from self-evident that 
the evolution of an indicator measuring a given country against others, against a 
defi ned reference country or particularly against some calculated value (the EU 
average, the United States level) should be the deciding factor in qualifying the 
assessment of a national economy’s performance and the direction of its econom-
ic policy. Instead we might think that the basis for qualifying a given national 
economy’s circumstances might lie in its performance so far and the status it at-
tained earlier. Or that public opinion might gauge the success of a set of eco-
nomic policies by the answers it off ers to the country’s impending strategic tasks 
or structural and social policy challenges, and not by how the country stands in 
comparison to others.
Nevertheless, in both amateur and professional assessments of the situation, we 
have ample experience of the important role assigned to the convergence phase. 
What is more, it is no exaggeration to state that the speed and scale of conver-
gence is the strategy itself, or an integral component thereof; meaning that it is as 
if the region’s countries are characterised by some kind of compulsion to measure 
up to others. 
Th ere are naturally many important reasons explaining this phenomenon. One 
of the obvious specifi c features of the globalization process is the simultaneity of 
business, political and intellectual processes, and thence the culture of constantly 
comparing economic and social indicators. Following their own internal logic, 
the organisations of integration – the European Union pre-eminently among 
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them – set the convergence of the less-developed members as their objective, de-
voting resources and specifi c policies to promoting this. In a less institutional-
ized way, every signifi cant international organisation, convention and grouping 
(OECD, G20, IMF) regards progress achieved in the hypothetical convergence 
progress as a qualitative facet of the member countries’ development. 
In the following we will take the convergence phenomenon and its inherent value 
to social policy as a given, as something which is therefore present somehow in 
the thinking of business and government decision-makers and opinion-formers. 
Under conditions in Hungary, the strength of the convergence notion is partic-
ularly easy to justify since the market economy (capitalism) emerged from the 
outset within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, albeit at a level below its more ad-
vanced territories, so that the making of continuous comparisons could scarcely 
have been avoided. 
Within the conceptual framework of macroeconomic convergence, the speed of 
income convergence to the EU average and the relative level reached are the meas-
ures of its success, most oft en based on the progress of the per-capita GDP indica-
tor. As a thorough study by Gábor Oblath (Oblath, 2014b) demonstrates, meth-
odological problems make assessment of the convergence process more diffi  cult, 
namely that: 1) price levels diff er in the countries involved in the international 
comparison, and likewise do not change at the same pace either; 2) population 
numbers may also evolve diff erently; and 3) GDP is not an adequate measure of 
income conditions, so that other indicators should be used (such as GNI or other 
macroeconomic indicators revealing changes in the terms of trade). Th e study 
emphatically recommends examination of the progress of productivity (domestic 
product per capita or per completed working hour).  
Oblath’s assertion – in accordance with other researchers on the issue – is that the 
Hungarian economy has substantially underperformed in the area of European 
convergence compared to the Visegrád countries that constitute a natural basis 
for comparison. In eight of the 22 years between 1991 and 2013 no convergence 
at all was discernible, while in only six of the remaining 14 years was rapid con-
vergence on the EU15 apparent based on per-capita indicators. However, adding 
nuance to these fi ndings is the fact that Hungary’s population declined in the 
meantime, while that of the EU15 increased (Oblath, op. cit., p. 48). In evaluating 
the evolution of Hungarian macroeconomic indicators, the author highlights two 
groups of factors: on the one hand, the unsustainable growth in gross and net 
external debt in proportion to GDP (between 2002 and 2008) and the subsequent 
debt reduction; and on the other hand, the relative slowness of progress in the 
quality of institutions.
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Chart 1
Economic convergence in the Visegrád countries, based on GDP per capita, at 
purchasing power parity, as a percentage of the EU15
Source: Oblath (2014b), data from AMECO system
To judge the success or failure of the Hungarian convergence process, it is worth 
knowing that in the 1960s the Hungarian economy stood at about 50% of the GDP 
per capita level of today’s EU15, while by the 1980s the Hungarian fi gure had risen 
to 65%–70% (Oblath, op. cit., p. 10). It is true that the period in question saw the 
then Hungarian People’s Republic rapidly run up a large-scale external debt, for 
which the Republic of Hungary following the change of regime would face the 
reckoning. Unfortunately, it is also true that between 2004 and 2006 the 65% level 
was reached again, and temporarily surpassed, only at the cost of renewed severe 
external indebtedness. 
Instead of a detailed explanation and analysis of the reasons for the relative un-
derachievement between the mid-2000s and recent times, it is enough here to 
highlight the progress of Hungary’s gross domestic product compared to its nat-
ural countries of reference. Even without knowledge of the political cycles and 
changes in direction of economic policy, a number of specifi c features of the fl uc-
tuation in Hungary’s performance are clearly apparent. One such feature is the 
strong moderate growth (of around 4% annually) with which Hungary entered 
the second decade of the political transformation; at the same time, we know that 
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aft er 2001 this was accompanied by the rapid escalation of external debt until the 
end of 2006, so that for several years the economy produced indicators above the 
natural rate of growth. In the wake of the fi rst substantial budget adjustment (in 
autumn 2006), economic growth stalled, while the other countries of the region 
showed rapid growth that was unusually strong even by European standards.
Chart 2
Annual growth in GDP volume in the ECE region
Source: Eurostat, Real GDP growth rate, annual % change, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/
eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tipsna10 (downloaded on 
17.02.2015)
In response to the fi nancial crisis unfolding in autumn of 2008, the output of 
most European economies declined (Poland being a notable exception). Th e Hun-
garian slump was deeper than both the European and regional average. Th e years 
following the crisis brought a fragile upswing, before the Hungarian economy fell 
into a recession in 2012, only reaching a growth rate (of 3.5%) corresponding to the 
global average in 2014. Hungary thus lagged behind the other Visegrád countries 
between 2005 and 2013. Its slump during the crisis was deeper than the others, 
while its performance in the few years both before and aft er the crisis was weaker: 
this is the statistical illustration of Hungary’s underachievement.
Economic structure, institutions, economic policies
But what are the underlying factors shaping economic statistical indicators, par-
ticularly those that can be infl uenced by economic policy actions? Does it help our 
analysis if we frame the problem within the middle-income context? Research 
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and analysis of the topic has undoubtedly gained impetus in the past 25 years 
since a number of very large, powerful and thus globally signifi cant economies 
joined the category to which the middle-income defi nition applies. Th e develop-
ment prospects of the so-called BRIC group of countries (expanded to BRICS, 
and then to BRIICS with the inclusion of Indonesia) have been a particular focus 
of attention. If these countries or other developing countries in their wake (or a 
majority thereof) were to manage to rise to the income group above, it would have 
great signifi cance for the global economy. As, naturally, would the disruption of 
these countries’ earlier growth rates if, having reached this imaginary thresh-
old, they begin to stagnate. It is therefore understandable that intensive research 
on these themes is ongoing under the aegis of the IMF, World Bank and OECD 
(OECD, 2014a).
Although the problems of Hungary’s economic development diff er sharply from 
those of the aforementioned large developing countries with their vast popula-
tions, such large-sample international analyses nevertheless provide a foothold in 
assessing the Hungarian situation. It is worth noting, for example, that the com-
prehensive OECD-sponsored study generally focused not on income levels, but 
rather on productivity in the economies of the aff ected groups of countries, even 
striving to provide a long-term prognosis (for 35 years) of potential development 
paths. As the report puts it, although there is no common conceptual framework 
to describe the trap in question, it is quite clear that economies on the middle-
income level oft en suff er a loss of pace, as well as a signifi cantly decelerating rise 
in their total factor productivity (TFP). Th is can be largely attributed to the fact 
that it is increasingly hard for them to climb higher on the value chain (OECD, 
op. cit., p. 9).
Although signifi cant masses are initially able to migrate from agriculture to in-
dustry (mainly processing), and from there to the service sectors, with an almost 
automatically rapid growth in output (and increasing labour productivity and 
real wages), diversifi cation into higher value-added activities is no longer a fore-
gone conclusion once these major structural movements are complete. Moreover, 
some of the BRIICS countries – possessing specifi c natural resources and riding 
the wave of raw material price increases in the early 2000s – tended instead to 
specialize further in production activities, even though shift ing further towards 
higher value-added operations would not only have promoted a steady rise in 
their income level, but would have simultaneously made the given national econ-
omy more resistant to external shocks (OECD, op. cit., p. 13). 
Th e diagnosis of dependence on production sectors does not apply to the Hun-
garian economy. What does apply, however, is that there is a strong correlation 
between increased industrial productivity on the one hand, and the proportion of 
business services and productivity growth in the service sectors on the other. It is 
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noteworthy that while in Indonesia the input of business services accounts for just 
2 thousandths of the total input of the processing industry, the equivalent fi gure 
in the French processing industry is more than 13% (op. cit., p. 21) – and in devel-
oped economies demand for business services (IT, marketing, market research, 
customer services, R&D, HR) continues to expand rapidly.
Recommendations put forward for another milieu can still have relevance for 
circumstances in Hungary, particularly when we know that economic policy re-
sponses to the loss of tempo oft en bring only temporary improvement – and not 
even that if they neglect the economy’s structural aspects. It is instructive to con-
sider what happened during a similar period of decelerating pace at the beginning 
of the 1980s in Hungary (see Bod, 1981). As their response to the unexpected stall-
ing of economic growth, the country’s economic leadership announced that capi-
tal must be concentrated in industrial developments with a comparatively rapid 
return. Th is seemingly sensible principle routinely prioritized manufacturing 
ahead of infrastructure and research. Th e kind of manufacturing that promised a 
rapid return was that which used familiar technology, where the products did not 
demand any great training requirement. Although it is relatively easy to acquire 
a presence on the global market for products that are less demanding in terms of 
technology, marketing and workforce, competition is also strong. Th e conditions 
for success in these product groups are tough: low wage levels, strong working 
discipline, precise cost calculation, and the ability to rapidly switch products and 
technology. Cheap wages, quick and disciplined reproduction, a strong inclina-
tion to economize: neither then nor subsequently was it possible to build a suc-
cessful modernization strategy on these virtues and capabilities under Hungary’s 
circumstances within the framework of European civilization. 
My research then found that profi t margins attached to the subsequent phases of 
the value chain – from raw materials through simple bulk production to sophisti-
cated products and services – formed a U-shaped curve: the rate of return on the 
unsophisticated products that provided the bulk of Hungarian manufacturing 
exports was situated around the low point of the U-shaped curve. Th e problem 
was not that the industrial activity shift ed towards the right on the curve within 
our economic structure, but that the shift  was not enough (Bod, op. cit., p. 34). Th is 
same idea reappeared in another form decades later, when development agencies 
recommended specialization in the phases that follow production and assembly, 
as well as those that precede the manufacturing phase, in order to evade the trap 
of moderately developed countries (World Bank, 2008).
Th e fi nancial crisis aft er 2007 accelerated a rethink of what were earlier seen as 
evident aspects of economic development. Among the reasons for the crisis could 
be listed the “bubble” in the fi nancial intermediary system, accompanied in many 
European countries by the decline of industry. In this way, the concept of rein-
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dustrialization appeared in the wake of the crisis, attributed to Vice President An-
tonio Tajani under the previous European Commission, before the Jean-Claude 
Juncker-led Commission then went on to proclaim the renaissance of industry 
(EC, 2014). Europe’s southern periphery was genuinely aff ected by deindustri-
alization from the beginning of the 1990s, to a degree diff ering from country to 
country, so that renewed growth in the share of industry – and within this manu-
facturing – rightly appeared on the agenda. It was in this context that the EU 
expressed the ambition to grow the share of the processing industry to 20% of 
GDP by the year 2020. Hungary’s situation is entirely diff erent, however, since 
this proportion is almost 25% here: we lead the way in this regard together with 
the Czech Republic, Germany and Ireland, the latter having a particularly highly 
developed assembly sector (Stöllinger et al., 2013). 
As regards pitting industrial activity against so-called “speculative” services, this 
would only make sense in Hungary if the proportion of these services – those of 
a fi nancial nature among them – were to exceed reasonable limits, necessitating a 
correction. An international comparison reveals, however, that the notion of de-
industrialization is not applicable to the current Hungarian economic structure. 
In theory, of course, the share of the processing industry can be increased fur-
ther, particularly if there is major demand on external markets for products 
that carry a comparative advantage for Hungary. At the same time, the external 
market for services is expanding strongly. Services comprise a dynamic seg-
ment of the world’s foreign trade; moreover the market for these is less volatile, 
so that economies specializing in the provision of services are less exposed to 
cyclical fl uctuations – which, in knowledge of the previously cited study by Gá-
bor Oblath, might prove an important factor in growing and stabilizing the 
Hungarian economy. 
In their analysis of development trends in European industry, Stöllinger and co-
authors demonstrate convincingly that the share of services in the expenditures 
of the modern European processing industry is increasing, and thus demand in 
service sectors is growing accordingly (Stöllinger et al., 2013, p. 7). However, the 
services bought by industrial concerns are largely sourced in the given country: 
on European average, the share of domestically sourced services is 87%, while a 
further 4% derive from other EU member states and 9% from third countries (op. 
cit., p. 7). Hungary’s task arising from this is to make the country more attractive 
as a destination for locating high value-added services with high productivity 
and paying favourable real wages. Th e domestic (national) share of European ex-
port activity is continuously decreasing, meaning that the share of foreign manu-
facturing and service capacities used for exports is growing; in other words, the 
global value chain is getting longer (IW, 2013, p. 72). With the geographical advan-
tages enjoyed by Hungary (and the Visegrád Group), we might gain signifi cant 
additional growth impetus from this trend. 
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Here, too, successful further progress has its own tough preconditions, the ful-
fi lment of which is by no means a foregone conclusion. It is no accident that the 
ascent from the group of middle-income countries is no easy matter, or that if 
there is to be convergence at all, it will take a very long time to arrive. Modern 
industries and connected services are sensitive to the physical, legal and fi nancial 
infrastructure alike, and require specifi c knowledge (both individual and net-
work-based). In determining the course of development of general linguistic, in-
termediate and advanced training, these medium and long-term processes must 
be taken as a basis, and not the phenomena of the crisis years aft er 2007. Other-
wise, the transition towards the next level of development might stretch beyond 
the unavoidable, or the danger of falling into the trap which lurks for each nation 
might become a reality.  
REFERENCES
Aiyar, S. – Duval, r. – Puy, D. –Yiqun Wu – Longmei Zhang (2013): Growth Slowdowns and the 
Middle-Income Trap. IMF Working Paper No. 13/71, Washington D.C. 
Bod, P.A. (1981): A Meditation on Common Views of Industrial Policy. Valóság XXIV (11), pp. 28–38.
Bod, P. A. (2014): Unconventional Economic Policies. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó.
Constantinescu, C. – Mattoo, A. – Ruta, M. (2015): Th e Global Trade Slowdown. Cyclical or 
Structural? http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/20
15/01/07/000158349_20150107092019/Rendered/PDF/WPS7158.pdf (downloaded on 12.01.2015).
Eichengreen, B. – Park, D. – Shin, K. (2011): When Fast-Growing Economies Slow Down: Interna-
tional Evidence and Implications for China. NBER Working Paper No. 16919.
European Commission (2014): For a European Industrial Renaissance, COM (2014) 14 fi nal: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0014 (downloaded on 
13.01.2015).
European Commission (2015): European Economic Forecast – Winter 2015. European Economy 
1/2015: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_fi nance/eu/forecasts/2015_winter_forecast_en.htm (down-
loaded on 06.02.2015).
Felipe, J. – Abdon, A. – Kumar, U. (2012): Tracking the Middle-Income Trap: What Is It, Who Is in 
It, and Why? Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, Working Paper No. 715. 
German-Hungarian Chamber of Industry and Commerce (2014): Results of the DUIHK’s 20th 
economic survey. http://www.ahkungarn.hu/fi leadmin/ahk_ungarn/Dokumente/Bereich_CC/
Publikationen/Konjunktur/2014/Konj2014_hu_web.pdf (downloaded on 03.09.2014).
Gill, I. – Kharas, H. (2007): An East Asian Renaissance: Ideas for Economic Growth. Washington 
D.C.: World Bank.
Győrffy, D. (2013): Institutional Trust and Economic Policy: Lessons from the History of the Euro. 
Budapest: Central European University Press.
Győrffy, D. (2014): A Revolution for the Status Quo: Was it Worth It? Portfolio.hu, 21 March 2014.
IW (2013): Industry as a Growth Engine in the Global Economy. Final Report. Köln: Institut der 
deutschen Wirtschaft .
A TEMPORARY LOSS OF PACE OR THE “MIDDLE INCOME TRAP” 17
Muraközy, L. (2013): An Age of Uncertainty. In: Muraközy, L. (ed.): Every Whole is Broken. Buda-
pest: Akadémiai Kiadó.
Oblath, G. (2013): In How Many Years? – On the Nature and Duration of Convergence. Statisztikai 
Szemle 91 (10), pp. 925–946.
Oblath, G. (2014a): Economic Instability and Regional Underachievement – Th e Case of Hungary. 
Külgazdaság, LVIII (5-6), pp. 5–42.
Oblath, G. (2014b): Economic Transformation, Impulse and Breakdown. In: Kolosi, T. – Tóth, 
I. Gy. (eds.): Social Report 2014. Budapest: TÁRKI, ISSN 1216-6561, www.tarki.hu/adatbank-h/
kutjel/pdf/b323.pdf.
OECD (2014a): Perspectives on Global Development 2014. Boosting Productivity to Meet the Mid-
dle-Income Challenge. Paris: Pocket Edition. http://www.oecd.org/development/pgd/pgd2014.
htm
OECD (2014b): 2014 Global Forum on Development. Paris: Background Notes, pp.1–5., http://www.
oecd.org/site/oecdgfd/backgroundnotes-gfd2014.htm.
Palócz, É. (2013): Some Real Economy Components of Hungary’s Economic Underachievement. In: 
Muraközy, L. (ed.): Every Whole is Broken. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó.
Stöllinger, R. – Foster-McGregor, N. – Holzner, M. – Landesmann, M. – Pöschl, J. – Stehr-
er, R. (2013): A ‘Manufacturing Imperative’ in the EU – Europe’s Position in Global Manu-
facturing and the Role of Industrial Policy. WIIW, Research Reports No. 391, pp. 1–26.
Teulings, C. – Baldwin, R. (eds.) (2014): Secular Stagnation: Facts, Causes, and Cures. CEPR Press. 
A VoxEU.org eBook.
Transparency International (2014): Corruption Perceptions Index 2014. http://www.transpar-
ency.org/whatwedo/publication/cpi2014 (downloaded on 06.12.2014).
World Bank (2008): Commission on Growth and Development: Th e Growth Report.
